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By establishing a series of similarities to the U.S., this study demonstrates the potential 
for Taiwan‘s recent progress on sustainable energy policy to influence American 
policymakers.  An assessment of Taiwan‘s current energy situation is contextualized within 
its economic development and political institutions. Taiwan‘s energy legislation has already 
leveraged significant financial investment to reshape an economy increasingly focused on 
clean energy technology.  In the future, Taiwan will continue to pursue aggressive energy 
legislation and the U.S. may draw inspiration from Taiwan‘s sustainable energy reforms. 
 




The argument has been made in the United States and elsewhere, that individual 
national action on energy policy and climate change is irrelevant due to the rapidly growing 
carbon footprints of the world‘s large developing nations, such as China.  Indeed, China 
continues to simultaneously concern and invigorate the world as its carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions and clean energy investments grow exponentially. But the path taken by small 
nations to establish and achieve energy and climate change goals should not be overlooked 
as a guide to larger nations. 
Although China‘s recent government policies targeting energy and climate change are 
often utilized as a benchmark for American inaction, a direct comparison between the two 
nations is inappropriate. China‘s massive economies of scale and authoritarian top-down 
planning are unique amongst the countries of the world and its government operates with a 
fundamentally different set of powers and constraints than the U.S.  In contrast, the small 
island nation of Taiwan has a minimal absolute impact on global CO2 emissions and energy 
use.  However, energy policy reform occurring in Taiwan may serve as a desirable model for 
the U.S.  Taiwan‘s economic, and political structures are similar to those of the U.S. and 
other developed western nations. Compared to America, Taiwan is confronted by equal or 
greater challenges in terms of energy security, fossil fuel dependence, CO2 emissions, and 
energy pricing reforms.  Operating within similar constraints, Taiwan has recently enacted 
legislation to transition to sustainable energy sources, increase energy efficiency, and lower 
CO2 emissions.  Thus, Taiwan can exert influence on global climate change by offering 
American policymakers guidance on sustainable energy reform. 
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II. Taiwan’s Key Similarities to the U.S.  
 
Unlike China, Taiwan is considered a stable nation that has already completed a 
meteoric period of economic growth and development.  Taiwan‘s population shares a similar 
demographic structure with many Western nations and its nascent democratic political 
system contains many of the same advantages and disadvantages as the United States. 
Taiwan developed in the image and partly due to the assistance of the U.S.  The 
―Taiwan Miracle‖ witnessed incredible economic growth spurred by land reform, industrial 
output, and $1.5 billion in USAID funding (Toledano, 1983).  Over a thirty-year period from 
1960-1989, Taiwan‘s economy averaged 9.5 percent annual growth (Tien, 1996).  Regarding 
Taiwan‘s capitalist success, an effusive 1983 National Review article stated that, ―The 
Republic of China (ROC) has the distinction of being the only country in the Far East that 
has fully adopted a Lockean, anti-mercantilist philosophy--the philosophy that made 
America great…The United States may ignore it officially, but the Republic of China on 
Taiwan is a symbol and a fulfillment‖ (Toledano, 1983).  Over the past fifty years, Taiwan‘s 
breakneck growth has allowed it to move up the economic value chain.  An economy once 
reliant primarily on agriculture gave way to manufacturing, and eventually the services sector.  
Today, Taiwan‘s economic breakdown resembles that of the U.S. (Central Intelligence 
Agency [CIA], 2010).  
 
2010 Economic Sector Breakdown 
 U.S. Taiwan 
Services 77% 59% 
Industry 22% 36% 
Agriculture 1% 5% 
 
As a developed nation Taiwan‘s demographics largely reflect those of the U.S.: 
increasingly urbanized and wealthy.  Seventy eight percent of Taiwanese live in urban areas, 
as do 82 percent of Americans (CIA, 2010).  The Taiwan Miracle also made Taiwan one of 
the world‘s wealthiest nations.  At $35,800, Taiwan‘s 2010 per capita GDP (on a PPP basis) 
ranked just slightly below Germany and 33rd worldwide (CIA, 2010).  Taiwan‘s similar 
trajectory of economic development and subsequent rates of wealth and urbanization lend 
themselves to high per capita consumption of energy.  Thus, like the U.S., Taiwan is forced 
to address issues of energy efficiency and CO2 emissions without compromising the 
luxurious, perhaps wasteful, amount of energy to which individual Taiwanese consumers are 
accustomed. 
The striking similarity of its political structure and overall political climate to that of 
the U.S. reinforces the relevance of Taiwan‘s progress on energy policy. Taiwan‘s young and 
vibrant democracy has evolved rapidly in just 25 years of non-authoritarian rule and clearly 
drawn inspiration from the U.S. political system. Taiwan boasts free elections, implements its 
laws through a well-defined legislative process, and has an independent judiciary (Pascual & 
Bush, 2007). Taiwanese media is highly engaged with civil society, and freedoms of speech 
are generally protected.  Although the country is governed by a semi-presidential system (a la 
France), the executive branch is still quite powerful.  Like the U.S., a Taiwanese president is 
the nation‘s most powerful political figure, the head of state, and commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces. Taiwan‘s presidents are selected by popular vote, serve four-year terms, and 
remain limited by a two-term limit. Perhaps most similarly to the U.S., Taiwan‘s political 
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system functions primarily as a two-party system with highly partisan regional base of 
support. The Kuomintang Party (KMT) has held the North while the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) has drawn support from the South. 
While democratic reforms have encouraged the development of a just and stable 
society, Taiwan has also undergone a period of political polarization affecting its ability to 
strategically plan for the future.  In their article, ―The Four Faces of Taiwan Democracy‖ 
Pascual and Bush (2007) highlight the systematic issues afflicting Taiwan‘s political system.  
The authors note that: 
 
Formal democratic institutions may exist but they don't work well. The 
transition to democracy was successful but it has not been followed by a full 
consolidation of democracy. Regrettably, Taiwan's institutions—semi-
presidentialism, the legislature, the party system, the electoral system, and the 
mass media—work together in a perverse way that rewards political 
gamesmanship over good policy. They reduce accountability, foster a zero-
sum political psychology, promote policy deadlock, ensure suboptimal policy 
performance, and defer consensus on the rules of the game. 
 
Taiwan‘s sclerotic policy-making process results from a gulf of distrust and animosity 
that exists between the KMT and DPP parties.  Taiwan‘s politicians make the vitriol found 
in U.S. politics seem tame; in the past decade alone there have been several well-publicized 
physical altercations on the floor of the Taiwanese legislature (Wang & Yan-chih, 2010).  
Additionally, Taiwanese politicians engender similar criticism as their U.S. counterparts in 
regards to an election-cycle mentality hindering long-term strategic planning.  
The Taiwanese media adds fuel to the fire of Taiwan‘s partisan political environment. 
Though tightly controlled by the KMT during authoritarian rule, Taiwan‘s media has 
undergone a rapid change during a period of intense commercialization and competition for 
viewership.  However, as Huang Ching-Lung of the Brookings Institute argues, the 
liberalization of press freedoms has not translated into improved media quality.  Huang 
(2007) observes that ―the ensuing super competition resulted in the media moving toward 
extremes, satisfying popular whims, and getting deeply involved in the political battles 
between the two sides. Thus the media in general became an accomplice in the polarization 
of society.‖ Taiwan‘s newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and 24-hour news stations 
often overtly support the KMT or DPP. The marked uptick in Taiwanese media polarization 
and coziness with political parties has led Freedom House, which once assessed Taiwan‘s 
media as the freest in Asia, to downgrade its assessment for a second consecutive year 
(Baum, 2011).  Moreover, polarization of media outlets has increased over the past decade 
and eroded any semblance of public trust in their journalistic credibility. 
In light of Taiwan‘s political-media polarization, Pascual and Bush (2007) assess 
Taiwan‘s political future.  The authors assert: 
 
We believe the problems here are mainly structural and systemic. One 
political camp or the other can be blamed for mistakes that each has made 
over the last decade to contribute to the current state of affairs. But political 
actors are acting within a structure that encourages these unfortunate types 
of behavior. 
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The current status as well as future prognosis for Taiwan‘s political atmosphere 
closely resembles that of the U.S.  Advocates of legislative reforms often bemoan America‘s 
hyper-partisan political posturing and never-ending election cycles as roadblocks to 
pragmatic policymaking.  In the U.S. media, networks have become more polemic in a 
similar quest for higher ratings.  Together, U.S. politics and media have served to further 
divide American society and defer responsibility for planning its future. An acrimonious 
atmosphere has led both U.S. and Taiwanese pundits to proclaim their political systems 
broken and fundamentally at odds with the interests of their citizens. 
Yet, in a political climate often more caustic than that of the U.S., Taiwan‘s warring 
political parties have still managed to enact multiple progressive energy policies.  The KMT 
party, currently in control of Taiwan‘s presidency and legislature, has seldom been cited as an 
environmental activist.  Yet the party is composed of industrialist technocrats able to see the 
strategic value of clean energy for Taiwan‘s continued economic growth and energy security.  
On the other side of the aisle, the DPP is supports sustainable energy legislation based on 
increased environmental protection and social justice. With unified economic, national 
security, and environmental concerns, Taiwan‘s political figures have temporarily 
surmounted political differences to act in the best interest of their constituents.  It remains 
to be seen whether Republican and Democratic legislators in the U.S. will be able to do the 
same. 
 
III. The Energy Situations in Taiwan and the U.S. 
 
The challenges that Taiwan faces related to energy use and CO2 emissions are as 
serious or perhaps even more so than those of the U.S.  Taiwan continues to rely on a higher 
proportion of fossil fuel than the U.S.  As a result, it lacks any semblance of energy security 
and ranks amongst the world‘s highest per capita CO2 emitters.  Like the U.S., a strong 
political lobby representing organizations with significant business interests in energy policy 
influences Taiwan. Taiwan‘s barriers to energy policy reform are also compounded by a 
model of artificially low electricity-pricing that interferes with transitioning to cleaner energy 
sources. 
Taiwan, like most industrialized nations, promoted economic development at the 
expense of the environment.  By the late 1980s, industrialization and high rates of car 
ownership led to tremendous levels of air, water and soil pollution.  As it began its cleanup, 
Taiwan was roughly twenty years behind the U.S. in terms of environmental protections 
(Allen, 1990).  Created in 1987, Taiwan‘s Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) 
has done an admirable job in reversing some of the worst effects of industrialization.  Yet, 
Taiwan still relies on a higher percentage of fossil fuels than the U.S.  Coal and oil comprise 
81 percent of Taiwan‘s primary energy supply (Ministry of Economic Affairs [MOEA], 
2010), compared with 58 percent in the U.S. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
[EIA], 2009a). 
Compounding the problem of reliance on fossil fuels is Taiwan‘s lack of natural 
resources and tenuous energy security.  While U.S. politicians have emphasized the 
importance of energy independence for decades, America still produces approximately three 
quarters of its primary energy and its largest oil importer is Canada, hardly a hostile or 
unstable nation (EIA, 2009a).  In contrast, Taiwan‘s 2010 share of its domestic energy supply 
fell to an all-time low of 0.6 percent (MOEA, 2010).  Taiwan has largely exhausted its 
minimal sources of domestic petroleum, natural gas, and coal, leaving it dependent on 
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foreign imports for over 99 percent of its energy demand.   Approximately half of Taiwan‘s 
primary energy comes from oil, the majority of which is shipped from the Persian Gulf and 
Western Africa.  As a result, Taiwan‘s oil supply is exposed to dual vulnerabilities:  regional 
instability in the Middle East and Africa and military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  Although 
cross-strait relations have enjoyed a recent thaw with the signing of the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), China‘s growing naval presence is a constant 
reminder about Taiwan‘s diminishing energy security. 
Despite its status as the 50th largest country in the world, Taiwan‘s overall energy 
consumption is 21st worldwide (EIA, 2010). Taiwan also ranks among the top twenty five 
nations for total and per capita CO2 emissions (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center 
[CDIAC], 2007).  In a 2010 Climate Change Performance Index conducted by the German-
based Climate Action Network, Taiwan ranked 47 out of 60 compared with its fellow high-
emission nations and finished third worst out of all Asian nations surveyed (Burke, Bals, & 
Lindsay, 2010). 
When discussing potential changes to the energy status quo, it is also important to 
mention the impact of lobbyists.  Upon initial examination, it would seem that Taiwan and 
the U.S. differ greatly in terms of lobbying interests. The U.S. energy lobby, comprised of 
major oil companies and electric utilities, is consistently one of America‘s largest lobbying 
groups.  Since 2000, the U.S. energy lobby has spent over U.S. $2.5 billion to influence 
congressional politics (Lacey, 2010).  In contrast, Taiwan‘s lobbying environment is 
fundamentally different due to nationalization of the oil and electricity generation industries.  
Despite some recent privatization reforms, Taiwan‘s energy and oil sectors are still 
dominated by state-run monopolies (Taiwan Power Co. and CPC Co., respectively).  
However, Taiwan does have a robust, private sector heavy-industry lobby that is greatly 
impacted by energy policy.  Industry is the largest energy consumer in Taiwan; its share of 
total domestic energy consumption has grown from 44.5 percent in 1994 to 52.5 percent in 
2009 (Bureau of Energy, 2011).  Thus, Taiwan‘s heavy industry lobby ostensibly serves the 
same role as the U.S. energy lobby in opposition to progressive energy legislation on the 
grounds of reduced business profitability. 
There is also a significant element of both the U.S. and Taiwanese lobbies that seek 
stronger legislation on CO2 emissions and renewable energy sources.  In 2005, U.S.-based 
Duke Energy publicly supported a tax on CO2 emissions on the grounds of greater long-
term certainty in the utilities‘ cost-analysis (Osborne, 2005).  In 2009, several other large U.S. 
utilities including Exelon and Pacific Gas & Electric withdrew from the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce due to the organization‘s strong opposition to global warming legislation 
(Sheppard, 2009).  In Taiwan, certain organizations oppose Taiwan‘s proposed energy policy 
reforms because they do not go far enough.  Taiwan‘s Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (BCSD), which includes most of Taiwan‘s largest industrial companies as 
members, noted opposition against the proposed GHG Reduction Act due to its limited 
scope and solely punitive nature (Huang, 2011). Taiwan BCSD Secretary General Niven 
Huang (2011) believes the legislation is hampered by its unclear ability to regulate the heavy 
industry and power generation sectors and an ambiguous time frame for a cap-and-trade 
system to emerge.  Huang (2011) contends that Taiwan‘s GHG legislation should not 
exclusively utilize CO2 legislation as a means of pollution control, but rather adopt a more 
holistic approach including pathways to invest in Taiwan‘s low-carbon economy and future 
global competitiveness. 
Perhaps the most significant barrier preventing Taiwan from reducing its energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions is its artificially low electricity price.  Taiwan boasts one of 
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the cheapest electricity rates in the world (Low, 2009).  From 1987-2007, the average 
electricity price in Taiwan decreased by seven percent (Liao & Lee).  Over the same time 
period, electricity rates in the U.S. increased by forty percent (EIA, 2009b).  In 2008, the 
state-run Taipower Company reported an average cost of NT $2.3 (U.S. $.076) per kilowatt-
hour (Low, 2009), nearly three times cheaper than the average electricity price of the E.U. 
(Europe‘s Energy Portal, 2010).  Cheap electricity discourages investment in energy 
efficiency and stunts the competitiveness of electricity generated by more expensive 
alternative energy sources.   As a result, several overseas investors have declared their 
renewable energy projects in Taiwan unprofitable and some have withdrawn from the island 
altogether (Ferry, 2010).  Even as Taipower faces deficits due to low electricity costs, reform 
does not remain an option (―No electricity price hikes,‖ 2011).  Just as raising the gasoline 
tax is anathema to any U.S. political campaign, hiking electricity bills in Taiwan remains 
politically poisonous and unfeasible. 
 
IV.  Taiwan’s Sustainable Energy Policy Progress 
 
Though it shares similar structural constraints with the U.S., Taiwan has made 
encouraging progress in enacting sustainable energy policy reforms.  In recent years, Taiwan 
has taken several steps to identify short-term and mid-term strategic goals supported by 
legislation and financing. 
In 2008, Taiwan‘s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) released the ―Framework 
of Taiwan‘s Sustainable Energy Policy,‖ a document outlining several measures that commit 
to modest short-term and mid-term goals in energy efficiency and CO2 emissions reductions.  
The government has pledged to decrease energy intensity twenty percent from 2005 levels by 
2015 and fifty percent by 2025 (MOEA, 2008).  Furthermore, Taiwan aims to return CO2 
emissions to 2008 levels between 2016-2020 and to 2000 levels by 2025 (MOEA, 2008).  
Taiwan has also pledged double its share of renewable energy as a proportion of total 
installed capacity from eight percent to sixteen percent by 2025 (Sun, 2010).  Taiwan has 
already developed most of its suitable hydropower sites (Hu, 2010), so the vast majority of 
renewable energy growth will come from the wind and solar energy sectors. 
In order to achieve these goals, the government has unleashed several new policies.  
The most heralded has been the Renewable Energy Development Act (REDA).  Passed in 
July 2009, REDA calls for a 6.5 gigawatt (GW) increase in renewable energy installed 
capacity, bringing Taiwan‘s total to ten GW within twenty years (Kuo, 2009).  REDA 
importantly establishes a system of feed-in tariffs for electricity generated by renewable 
energy and compels Taiwanese utilities to purchase it.  The Act also created a renewable 
energy development fund bankrolled in part by utilities that use fossil fuel and nuclear power 
generation. In addition to REDA, the legislature has passed a series of measures intended to 
transform Taiwan into a low-carbon country by 2020 (Shih, 2009).  The government has 
called for the creation of two low-carbon pilot communities per city or county over the next 
two years with fifty percent of energy supplied by renewable sources.  In five years, Taiwan 
aims to achieve six low-carbon counties or cities. 
To support its nascent legislation, Taiwan has demonstrated its commitment through 
financial support for several initiatives.  From 2010-2015, the government is preparing to 
invest U.S. $1.47 billion to promote renewable energy and energy research and development.  
The government‘s plan is expected to leverage an additional U.S. $200 billion in private 
investment while saving the country billions in energy costs and creating thousands of jobs 
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(Gates, 2010). Over the same period, the Ministry of the Interior has announced a U.S. $100 
million investment in green architecture.  The plan is estimated to create 243,000 jobs in 
related sectors while reducing 3.82 million tons of CO2 (―Government to promote,‖ 2010). 
The government has also invested U.S. $260 million to develop Penghu Island into Taiwan‘s 
first low-carbon pilot region.  By 2015, over half of Penghu‘s primary energy will be 
generated by renewable sources, cutting its CO2 emissions fifty percent from 2005 levels 
(Yang, 2010). 
Taiwan‘s government legislation and investments in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency are routinely projected to create thousands of jobs and leverage private investment 
by a factor of ten.  The passage of the REDA was predicted to spark a U.S. $1 billion 
investment in renewable energy technology alone (Kuo, 2009). Strategic Taiwanese 
government investment in sectors such as solar, LED, and electric vehicles are part of a 
larger economic strategy to expand low-carbon industrial production from $5 billion to $35 
billion in five years and create 110,000 jobs (Chan, 2009b).  Thus, moderate energy goals 
have spurred the investment, innovation, and job creation that will drive Taiwan‘s future 
economic competitiveness. 
While the steps taken so far are impressive, two pieces of legislation currently under 
debate could amplify the impact of existing measures and elevate Taiwan to the status of a 
world leader in sustainable energy policy.  Taiwan‘s legislature is currently debating the 
passage of a domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions act.  Under current parameters, 
Taiwan‘s EPA will manage GHG emissions permits and create performance standards.  
Ultimately, the law would implement an overall GHG emissions target and cap-and-trade 
system.  Successful passage of the bill would bestow upon Taiwan the distinction of being 
the first country in Asia to enact a national cap-and-trade program.  There has also been 
recent discussion surrounding a tax on CO2 and fossil fuels. A lowering of both the 
corporate and income tax rates would offset the additional tax burden on fossil fuel 
consumers and proceeds would subsidize public transportation, low-income families, and 
energy efficiency research (Chan, 2009a). Annual revenues of Asia‘s first potential carbon tax 
could reach U.S. $12.4 billion by 2021 (Chan, 2009a). 
When evaluating Taiwan‘s legislation and investment in clean technology and low 
carbon projects, it is important to address scale and proportionality with the U.S. 
In terms of overall investment, Taiwan pales in comparison with its American counterpart.  
In 2009, the American Recovery and Investment Act, or ―The Stimulus Bill,‖ allocated 
roughly U.S. $50 billion to clean energy and another $17 billion in energy efficient 
transportation (Wang, 2009).  In 2010, the U.S. annual investment in clean technology 
increased 51% to $34 billion, ranking it third in the world (Pew Environment Group, 2011).  
The U.S. also remains a powerhouse in sales of clean technology, coming in second place in 
the world (Van den Berg & Van der Slot, 2009).  However, given the fact that the American 
economy is roughly 35 times the size of Taiwan‘s, both nations‘ clean technology 
investments and sales are more aptly compared when considered as a percentage of GDP.  
Taiwan‘s $1.47 billion investment plan is approximately 0.35 percent of its 2010 GDP while 
the U.S.‘ $67 billion dollar green stimulus investment is slightly higher at 0.45 percent. 
Weighted by percentage of GDP, Taiwan‘s clean technology sales rank fifteenth worldwide, 
outpacing the U.S. in nineteenth place (Van den Berg & Van der Slot, 2009).  In a 2009 
report published by the World Wildlife Fund, Taiwan also claimed first place of all nations 
studied in solar PV sales as a proportion of GDP while the U.S. did not place in the top five 
for any of the clean technology industries surveyed (solar, wind, biofuels, and insulation) 
(Van den Berg & Van der Slot, 2009). 
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In regards to clean energy policy and investment, Taiwan and the U.S. seem to be 
moving in opposite directions.  Due to recent legislation and investment priority, Taiwan has 
seized an opportunity to reorient its economy towards clean technology while the U.S. has 
stalled and lost a once commanding lead. In terms of five-year growth in clean technology 
investment, the U.S. came in eleventh place out of the G-20 nations (Pew Environment 
Group, 2011).  Despite a surge in funding from the U.S. stimulus, an uncertain national 
policy environment persists to discourage investment.  The U.S. federal government has not 
been successful in passing a national renewable energy standard, carbon tax, cap-and-trade 
or feed-in-tariff system, nor is any such legislation likely to pass under a divided government.  
Taiwan has successfully implemented some of these policies (renewable standard and feed-
in-tariff), deliberated on others (carbon tax, cap-and-trade) and shifted its economy with 
strategic government investment towards a greater dependence clean energy for growth. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Due to it‘s small population and murky political status, Taiwan is often overlooked in 
the realm of global affairs.  But a rash of similarities with the U.S. in terms of economic, 
demographic, and political structure warrant its consideration in the field of sustainable 
energy policy.  Taiwan‘s interrelated issues of unsustainable energy imports, fossil fuel 
dependence, energy consumption, and CO2 emissions are compounded by obstacles such as 
the government‘s refusal to correct artificially low electricity rates.  In spite of these negative 
factors, Taiwan has passed multiple progressive policies that address energy efficiency, 
renewable energy installation, and the promotion of its domestic clean technology industry. 
The modest success of Taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy demonstrates the 
importance of setting short-term and mid-term goals, even if they initially generate sub-
optimal outcomes.  Indeed, Taiwan‘s short-term and mid-term CO2 emissions and renewable 
energy targets are relatively conservative and fall well short of proposals pushed forth by the 
E.U. and other world leaders.  However, Taiwan‘s modest goals have fostered important 
legislation and financial investment that provide important price signals to its burgeoning 
clean technology industry.  Thus, Taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy is the beginning of a 
process of reorienting Taiwan‘s economy towards the energy technology sector, enhancing 
its economic competitiveness, environmental health, and contribution to global climate 
change initiatives. 
The U.S. and Taiwan have a special relationship.  Over the past 50 years, Taiwan has 
learned and benefited from the U.S.-style of economic, political, and cultural development.  
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